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The journal ECO: REVISTA DE LA CULTURA DE OCCIDENTE published its
first volume in May 1960, with the financial support of the Instituto
Cultural Colombo-Alemán in Bogotá, Colombia. The journal continued to
publish its volumes on a monthly basis until 1984, weathering five changes
in editorial leadership and periodic financial difficulties. In the early years,
its editorial staff and contributors were drawn primarily from a small local
group of European expatriate intellectuals. Its editors, in announcing their
intention to provide a voice of and for la cultura de occidente, advocated a
fundamental connection between Latin America and the Western tradi-
tion. At the same time, the journal proposed what at first glance must have
struck many Latin American readers as little more than a curiosity: it prom-
ised to introduce its Latin American audience to a Germanic face that had
historically been overshadowed in these latitudes by its French, English,
and Spanish brethren.
A survey of the volumes published in the first years of the journal’s exis-
tence underscores several important differences that distinguish Eco from
other cultural reviews published in Latin America during the Cold War
years. For one thing, the near absence of Latin American authors in the ini-
tial years of the journal’s publication is striking.1 The early volumes com-
prise a diverse collection of Spanish-language translations, primarily of
texts originally written in German. The works chosen for translation cover
a broad range of fields, including modern poetry, short stories, and literary
criticism, as well as myriad essays on philosophy, physics, economics, soci-
ology, education, and political theory. The diversity of materials is in fact so
pronounced that it leaves one with the sense of dealing with an arbitrary
selection. While there are very few published accounts of the journal’s his-
tory to be found, it is not difficult to surmise that the unusual orientation of
the journal is due in part to the nostalgia of a particular expatriate commu-
nity.2 What cannot be easily explained by recourse to psychological notions,
however, is the prevailing tone in which this dissemination takes place, a
tone of crisis and decline. This crisis, which Eduardo Jaramillo aptly terms
a “humanism in exile,” concerns a certain concept of “culture” whose con-
tinued viability as a historical or ideological project has been called into
question midway through the twentieth century. Faced with the emergence
of new technological and economic forces, as well as a radical redrawing of
geopolitical boundaries following the end of World War II, the journal
reflects the uneasy sense that the notion of “culture” that prevailed in what
we call “the West” for much of the previous two centuries is today deci-
sively losing ground to the nihilistic drive of individualism and technicity.
It is the interrelation between the cultural, the geopolitical, and nihilism
that I propose to explore here, and which may in turn shed some light on
the uncertain status of Eco as a Latin American cultural journal.
The essence of nihilism is to bring about what Nietzsche termed the
devaluation of the highest values—highest either in the sense of a “true”
world believed to lie beyond ours, or in the sense of a transcendent mean-
ing assigned to existence in this world (such as an ultimate meaning, des-
tiny, or unity). In contrast to both religion and secular humanism,
nihilism prompts the complacent attitude that life leads to nothing, and
that all “truth” is merely an “appearance” projected by the will itself. The
two-page editorial statement which inaugurates the first published vol-
ume of Eco in 1960 (hereafter referred to as “Propósito”) concludes with
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an allusion to the journal’s title, a figure which can be heard as constitut-
ing a kind of bridge between the Germanic and Hispano-American worlds.
At the same time, it announces the journal’s intentions to combat the
spread of nihilism through the revitalization of the “spirit” of the Western
cultural tradition.
Esta revista aspira a constituir un eco de las más notables y verdaderas voces
de Occidente, en particular del ámbito alemán. Mas su propósito no es la
producción de un mero reflejo intelectual, sino estimular, en la medida de
sus fuerzas, la aventura espiritual del hombre de Occidente y, de modo más
concreto, del hombre hispano-americano. Esas voces y ese eco son nuestro
programa de acción. Sólo el espíritu defiende al espíritu.
[This journal aspires to echo the most notable and truthful voices of the
West, and in particular within the German sphere. Its purpose is not to pro-
duce a mere intellectual reflection, but rather to stimulate, to the greatest
extent of its power, the spiritual adventure of Western man, and, more con-
cretely, of Hispano-American man. Those voices and this echo give shape to
our plan of action. Spirit alone comes to the defense of spirit.]
The disclaimer found in the second sentence aims to defuse two potentially
fatal charges in the same breath. In Spanish as in English, reflejo can mean
either the sensible reflection produced by a mirror or some other surface as
it throws back light or heat toward its original source, or it can mean the
intellectual activity involved in consideration, recollection, and the mind’s
knowledge of itself. Both of these senses are employed in this phrase, which
plays with and seeks to justify the journal’s somewhat surprising title.
Let us focus for a moment on each of these senses in turn. In the first
sense, the noun reflejo refers metonymically to the act of imitation, albeit
in order to assert what the journal will not be. The caveat seeks to defuse
the charges of Eurocentrism that will inevitably follow a Latin American
journal whose goal is, according to a March-April 1971 editorial (hereafter
referred to as “Adónde vamos”), “the transmission of the cultural treas-
ures of European origin” (465). The European and Germanic origin of this
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translation project, the editorial insists, does not represent an eidos which
Hispano-American cultural production would be expected to emulate. The
results of this project of translation and dissemination will not be reitera-
tions of the same. But what, then, are these “echoes” if they are not iden-
tical to what they repeat? I will return to this question below.
The second sense of reflection, as intellectual activity, similarly seeks to
distance itself from suspicions that the journal engages in nothing more
than abstract speculation and elitism (a different form of nihilism, per-
haps). What, then, is the link that would justify the journal’s attempt to sit-
uate itself on the side of praxis rather than mere theory? A response is
immediately offered in the preceding clause: “sino estimular, en la medida
de sus fuerzas, la aventura espiritual . . .” A similar sentiment can be found
in the second editorial statement just mentioned (“Adónde vamos”). It is
worth citing as well, in that it helps to shed more light on the complexity
that accompanies the references to “culture” in Eco:
Cuando buscamos lo bueno dondequiera que se esconde, así fuese en los
más apartados rincones del pensamiento o de la inventiva poética, lo hace-
mos sin parar mientes en la opinión de quienes nos tildan de “escapistas,”
pero convencidos, eso sí, de que un solo apunte del viejo Lichtenberg, una
sagaz observación de Jacobo Burkhardt, una página de Kafka bien leída, vig-
orosamente estimulan el descontento frente al estado de la cultura contem-
poránea y más eficazmente contribuyen a nuestras inquietudes que cien
manifestaciones mal concebidos y peor escritos.
[When we seek the good wherever it may hide, be it even in the most
obscure regions of thought or of poetry, we do so without stopping to con-
sider the opinion of those who fault us for being “escapists.” We are con-
vinced, indeed, that a single note from old Lichtenberg, a wise observation
of Jakob Burkhardt, or a single page of Kafka read well, vigorously stimulate
our dissatisfaction with the contemporary state of culture, and more effec-
tively prompt our uneasiness than do a hundred manifestoes that are poorly
conceived and even more poorly written.]
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This second passage underscores the distance from nihilism that Eco
would like to claim for itself: its material, far removed from escapist fan-
tasy, harbors a radical potentiality that promises an antidote against the
reduction of all being to the terms of technicity. It is capable of provoking
in the reader a sense of descontento, of unpleasure or discontent with the
world as it appears today, prompting him or her to awaken, take a step back,
and call into question truths that had heretofore seemed self-evident. The
rhetorical manipulation of the notion of aesthetic pleasure, a figure first
evoked in the paraphrased allegation of escapismo and appearing again in
the reference to descontento, gives notice that the role which the journal
envisions for its material does not necessarily coincide with traditional aes-
thetic ideologies, according to which literature and the arts are either seen
as a merely pleasurable—and hence essentially unproductive—activity, or
are assigned a restorative role of preserving or recuperating truth in the
form of values and identities. Indeed, the most interesting implication of
this account lies in what it refuses: in appealing to literature (as well as
other forms of writing), this discourse resists situating its object on either
side of the metaphysical distinction between being and nonbeing, truth and
falsity, or productivity and nonproductivity. It refuses to accept the politi-
cal condemnation of literature as escapism, but it does not fully accede to
the customary argument that literature is in fact on the side of production,
truth, and being. What is more, this passage does not offer a theory of “lit-
erature”—understood as an art object or work of genius—at all. Instead, it
describes an experience of the literary. Whatever it is that calls out and
shakes us in “Kafka” is not reducible to any innate quality belonging to the
writer or the work (genius, etc.), but is rather a matter of reading well (“una
página de Kafka bien leída”). In this light, the difference which literature
could be said to make is necessarily beyond calculation.
H U M A N I S M I N E X I L E :  E C O A N D
T H E G E O P O L I T I C S O F T H E C O L D W A R
In view of the increasing demand for specialized knowledge in modern soci-
ety, the disregard shown by Eco for both disciplinary boundaries and the 
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distinction between general and specialist knowledge should be understood
as an attempt to reaffirm the status enjoyed by the arts and letters within the
humanistic tradition: that is, a totality and unity that is in principle available
to all, and which is seen as instrumental for the development of human
virtue. Similarly, the full title of the journal signals its intent to recover a cer-
tain understanding of “culture” whose emergence coincided precisely with
the formation of modern nation-states in Europe and the Americas begin-
ning in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and which was
regarded by many intellectuals as an ideal instrument for shaping good citi-
zens for the state. This concept of culture, understood pedagogically as the
training of the mind, judgment, and taste for the development of the
“whole” person, called for a fusing of the particular and the universal, or a
crossing of national character with a tradition of art, language, and thought
regarded as the common heritage of the West. By the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, however, the necessity of culture had been called into question by the
emergence of new competition from the economic and technological
spheres. The logic of the market was felt to play an increasing role in shap-
ing subjectivity on the one hand, and the incursion of transnational forces in
Latin America—such as new forms of telecommunication and transporta-
tion—could likewise be said to cast their shadows over the edifice of the
nation-state and national culture. Responding to the increasing dominance
of technology in the postwar years, the nascent journal envisioned itself as a
kind of stabilizing jetty against the rationale of technicity, which nihilisti-
cally asserts itself as the sole legitimate measure of the good.3
The historical moment of Eco’s emergence is characterized by a general
feeling of pessimism among intellectuals in Europe and the Americas
regarding the viability of the Western tradition as a guiding historical force.
A good number of the texts chosen for translation attest to the fact that it is
increasingly difficult for critical intellectuals to sustain their belief that the
resources of the Enlightenment will be sufficient to ensure the survival of
Western civilization. In the wake of two world wars and Auschwitz, fol-
lowed by the onset of the Cold War and the partitioning of Europe into two
armed camps—each of which is calculating the technological annihilation
of the other—the West is confronted by the impossibility of sustaining its
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old belief in the ideals of progress, rationality, equality, and justice. The
emergence of Eco both testifies to this impossibility and avoids it.
One of the most poignant indicators of this can be found in the myriad
articles reflecting on the dissolution and scattering of a broad intellectual
community that formerly resided in Central Europe. Exile names the fate of
all those who, for one reason or another, by virtue of wartime devastation or
postwar political divisions, find themselves permanently displaced, unable
to return home and resurrect their prewar lives. Noteworthy in this respect
is the translation of an essay by George Steiner (1964), which recounts the
plight of the German Marxist literary critic Hans Meyer. Unlike many
Central European intellectuals who opted not to return home—or who were
simply unable to return—following World War II, Meyer was determined to
resume work at his university position in Leipzig, a city long known as the
capital of the German printing industry, but which now belonged to a new
sphere known as Eastern Europe or the Soviet bloc. Meyer returned to his
position in Leipzig, where he withstood years of political pressure and iso-
lation before finally resigning his post and leaving his home altogether. For
Steiner, Meyers’s saga is indicative of the fate not only of a generation but of
an entire way of life. His ultimate abandonment of Leipzig signals that the
world formerly known as Central Europe has now become unlivable, and
that future generations there will—to Steiner’s eternal lament—more likely
feel at home in Peking or Albania than in Cologne.
One suspects that the anti-communist tenor of Steiner’s essay hides an
even more profound uneasiness concerning the new trajectory that the
West seemed likely to take following the war. Through his personalization
of the plight of the Central European intellectual, Steiner also calls atten-
tion to the radical dismantling and reorganization of a specific, concrete
spatial order that had defined the West—with Europe of course at its cen-
ter—for much of modernity. Not only have national boundaries in Europe
been redrawn and sovereign states fragmented according to new
friend/enemy distinctions, but the very calculus of the political would
appear to have shifted—and with it, no doubt, the status of culture itself.
The old, culturally-inscribed criteria on which friend/enemy distinctions
were based in the West (civilized/barbaric) are rapidly being displaced by
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a new set of economic criteria (debtor/creditor) coinciding with the hege-
monic role assumed by the United States and the concurrent spread of the
“American way of life.” These reservations concerning the planetary
spread of the “American way of life” were shared by many in Latin America
in the decades following World War II who did not need Europeans to warn
them of the violence inherent in the Western Hemisphere policies of the
United States. The prevailing discourse of Eco, while by no means anti-
American in tenor, seeks to align itself with this general sense of apprehen-
sion and resistance, presenting “Western culture” as an antidote to an
individualist consumer mentality that could—at least in the early 1960s—
only be associated with the United States.
Were one to change the dates of publication by 50 or more years back in
time, it would be easy to position Eco alongside Domingo Sarmiento, José
Enrique Rodó, and other Latin American intellectuals who turned to
European high culture for solutions to Latin America’s social, political, and
economic problems. Sarmiento’s project, however, belongs to an entirely
different time. The emergence of Eco coincides, whether one cares to
acknowledge it or not, with the awareness that the nineteenth-century con-
cept of culture, and the project it entailed, is now on its deathbed. The many
appeals to “the Western tradition” should not be taken at face value as
referring to a stable point of reference—or at least not exclusively so. In
addition, these calls should be heard as the uncanny echoes of an emerging
attunement, and as attempting to name something new. One could charac-
terize the gap between Sarmiento and Eco as a reversal of terms: whereas
Sarmiento imagined that Latin America needed European culture to over-
come its congenital “lack,” Eco espouses the conviction that the Western
tradition needs Latin America if it is to take on a new life.
E C O A N D T H E L A T I N A M E R I C A N
L I T E R A R Y B O O M
The journal gives evidence of several significant transformations during the
early to mid 1960s, in particular concerning the geographical and linguistic
origin of the texts selected for publication. As a result, the journal assumes
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two new focal points: Hispanism and Latin America. In 1964, the Spanish
press Seix Barral—which, in the same year, would for the first time award
its prestigious Biblioteca Breve prize to a Latin American novel, Mario
Vargas Llosa’s La ciudad y los perros—signed on as a financial backer of the
journal. As part of the agreement, beginning in November 1964 the edito-
rial duties were to be shared between Hernando Valencia Goelkel (previ-
ously editor of the journal Mito) in Bogotá, and José María Castellet (a
Spanish poet) in Barcelona. The editorial statement written by Castellet for
the December 1964 edition announced a new regional emphasis: its new
orientation would allow the journal to combat the prevailing “cosmopoli-
tanism” of the times—which term, for Castellet, was synonymous with
rootlessness and the homogenization of differences—by turning to a
Hispanist identity politics. In the short term, this proclamation did not do
much to lessen the journal’s heavy emphasis on translated Germanic texts.
And in fact, the financial and editorial relationship between Eco and Seix
Barral proved to be short-lived and was terminated six months later (the
last coproduced volume was published in May 1965). However, this brief
marriage with a major Spanish printing house did leave at least one notable
mark on the face of Eco: the following years were accompanied by a steady
increase in the publication of literary texts by Latin American authors, as
well as literary analysis of the works of Gabriel García Márquez and others.
If it is true, as the Chilean novelist José Donoso suggests, that the Latin
American Boom novel had to travel to Spain in order to establish its place
among the “great works” of the Western tradition, then the transformation
of Eco between 1960 and 1964 gives evidence of the speed with which this
signal traveled between Latin America and Spain and back again.
The new attention to Latin American writers in Eco underscores the two-
fold significance often attributed to the Boom novel. On one hand, the crit-
ical renown and economic success of writers like Cortázar, Fuentes, García
Márquez, and Vargas Llosa abroad translates into the perception that Latin
America has finally attained autonomy in terms of symbolic production.
Latin America is no longer consigned to the peripheral status of consum-
ing—and reproducing bad copies of—European models, and likewise its lit-
erary production ceases to be captive to the provincial constraints of local
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taste. In other words, Latin America can no more be regarded as a site of
mere particularity: the Boom marks its entrance onto the universal stage of
Western civilization. But the celebration of the Boom is not based exclu-
sively on the presumed leveling-out of the dissymmetry that has always
marked Latin America in relation to the West. The association of the Boom
with autonomy also underscores the feeling that “Latin America” repre-
sents something different vis-à-vis the rest of the West, and that the periph-
eral status it has historically been assigned is in fact a reflection—albeit a
“distorted” one—of a singularity that cannot easily be translated into the
common language of the Western tradition. The seemingly ubiquitous rep-
etition of the anthropological theme of a “return to the origin” in the Boom
novel underscores both of the senses at work in this notion of symbolic
autonomy. This theme tropologically asserts the power of Latin American
literature itself to name and bestow meaning. At the same time, in repeat-
ing a view of Latin America that has always formed a central point in the
European imaginary (Latin America as “Nature” vs. Europe as “culture”),
it also points to the necessary failure of all naming, the void which haunts
the advent of the signifier.
¿Pero la América Latina, qué es? ¿Acaso se trata de nada más que de una
noción geográfica, buena para delimitar la masa de tierra que del Río Grande
se extiende hasta el Cabo de Hornos? ¿O de una comunidad puramente
lingüística, formada por las veintiuna naciones americanas que hablan
lenguas derivadas del latín?
¿O si representa el término algo más y cosa distinta de esas dos
definiciones un tanto elementales, como tácitamente se supone o expresa-
mente se estatuye hoy día, dondequiera que de Latinoamérica se hable o se
escriba en otras latitudes?
Compartimos esta última opinión, aunque no sabríamos decir a ciencia
cierta en qué consiste ese “algo más,” esa “otra cosa” por la cual acaso se dis-
tinga la América del Sur fundamentalmente de la del Norte, o del Viejo
Mundo, de Asia, de Oceanía, etc., y la incertidumbre se nos hace caracterís-
tica del fenómeno mismo que contemplamos.
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[But Latin America, what is it? Is it nothing more than a geographical
notion, useful for delimiting the land mass that begins at the Rio Grande
and runs south to Cape Horn? Or is it simply a linguistic community
formed by the twenty-one American nations which speak languages derived
from Latin?
Or does it represent something more and other than these somewhat ele-
mentary definitions, as is tacitly assumed or expressly stated today when-
ever one speaks or writes of Latin America in other latitudes?
We are of the latter opinion, although we would not know how to say for
certain what this “something more” or “otherness” is, which distinguishes
South America from North America, and from the Old World, Asia,
Oceania, etc. And this uncertainty, it seems to us, is characteristic of the
very phenomenon we are contemplating.]
The journal’s turn to Latin America as a topos worthy of reflection
underscores, as this excerpt from the “Adónde vamos” statement shows,
the importance which the journal had always attributed to literature. As the
editorial statement cited here emphasizes, the question of Latin America—
“What is it?”—is taken up as something that cannot be answered by the sci-
ences, and which likewise cannot be reduced to any of the specific empirical
traits (geography, language, etc.) that distinguish this region from those in
other latitudes. Indeed, Latin America would seem to stand for something
in excess of any definition—or maybe it is the excess of definition itself, the
fact that no definition quite fits when it comes to Latin America. If we read
between the lines here, we can gather that it is the task of literature—and
perhaps literature alone—to come to terms with this radical uncertainty at
the heart of (Latin American) being.
E C O A N D T H E S P E C T E R O F N I H I L I S M :
L A N G U A G E ,  V A L U E S ,  A N D D E A T H
Let us return to the “Propósito” editorial statement cited above. The text
begins with a translated excerpt from Ernst Jünger’s recently published 
An der Zeitmauer (1959): “The West has many sciences, and is capable of
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turning even the most insignificant matter into scientific knowledge. For
all this, however, it lacks a science of happiness.” This explicit differentia-
tion of “happiness” or well-being from “knowledge” and “progress” fol-
lows the same path established in Jünger’s earlier diagnoses of Western
modernity as suffering from the cancerous spread of nihilism (see Junger
1931, 1951). The editorial statement goes on to refer to a world crisis char-
acterized by “a severe undermining of values, whose consequences include
a lack of harmony within today’s culture and civilization.” For Jünger,
nihilism is realized when all spheres of life are reduced to the logic of tech-
nicity, which he describes as “total work-character” (totalen Arbeits-
charakter). In other words, the calculus of labor, which measures
everything in terms of efficiency and exchange value, becomes the only
conceivable—because entirely self-evident—measure for all of being. The
crisis, as both Jünger and Eco understand it from their respective positions,
entails a conflict between the humanist tradition and its highest values on
the one hand, and an increasingly dominant array of techno-scientific and
capitalist forces whose calculus is grounded exclusively in self-affirmation
on the other hand.
The translated presence of Jünger in Eco raises interesting questions
about the possibilities of “overcoming” nihilism, and moreover about what
resources the humanist tradition—and especially art and literature—might
still be able to contribute today in a confrontation with nihilism. Let me
now propose that the exchange between Ernst Jünger and Martin
Heidegger concerning the nature of nihilism, as well as the question of con-
fronting it, can help to shed light on the cultural politics of Eco. More
specifically, Heidegger’s reading of Jünger can be used to show that the
recourse to culturalism is unable to distance itself sufficiently from what it
seeks to resist, precisely because the metaphysical determination of cul-
ture—as a form of permanence or transcendence—is always already
marked by the spectral essence of nihilism. The culturalist negation of
nihilism is itself nihilistic. But in so doing, I do not wish to suggest that an
unacknowledged “nihilism” defines the entirety of Eco and its possibilities.
Heidegger’s response to Jünger, originally written for a collection pub-
lished in 1955 in honor of the latter, first bore a very similar title to Jünger’s
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1951 essay: Über “die Linie.”4 In that essay, Heidegger suggests that Jünger’s
diagnosis of nihilism, as well as the course of treatment he prescribes for
moving into a new phase of cultural life, may in fact be too hastily con-
ceived. The medical model of diagnosis and prognosis is a bit too eager to
identify the disease in order to have done with it. By single-mindedly pur-
suing a “cure,” we ignore an equally grave danger: that the very discourse
we charge with leading us out of the abyss of nihilism is in fact part and par-
cel of what is going badly with the world today.
Jünger’s analysis employs the spatial metaphor of a “zero line” (Null-
Linie) to describe the culmination of nihilism, demarcating a time in which
the essence of nihilism will have silently infiltrated all the “component
realities” (Bestand) of our world (all social relations, practices, and ration-
alities) and established itself as the “normal state,” as something that goes
without saying. According to Jünger, we are today moving into this zone of
fulfilled nihilism, which is embodied by the total subsumption of all
humanity in the figure of the worker. The “worker,” in Jünger’s analysis,
functions as a topos and organizes a kind of “optical system,” allowing him
to track the planetary spread of nihilism via the technological reduction of
all reality to what he calls “total work-character.” We will have entered into
the zone of accomplished nihilism when the rationality specific to labor,
always already calculated to generate more accumulation—its ways of
organizing social relations, measuring time and value, valuing productivity
over all other concerns—succeeds in establishing itself as the one and only
true measure. Crossing the line would open up two very distinct possibili-
ties: either we could end up in the timeless nothingness of full-blown
nihilism, or we could find ourselves to have stepped out of nihilism and
into something new. Jünger, needless to say, favors the second possibility,
which he terms a “new turning-towards or granting on the part of being”
(Zuwendung des Seins).
Heidegger, meanwhile, finds problematic the assumption that we have
already foreseen the totality of what nihilism has to offer in all of its vari-
ous manifestations, and thus find ourselves prepared to surpass this phe-
nomenon essentially. Before we can begin to speak of crossing the line (if
we can ever speak of crossing it), we must first know what we are speaking
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of when we refer to the line itself. He thus frames his original title as a ques-
tion of the line, or of a phenomenon whose essence, he insists, is not itself
nihilistic. Until the essence of nihilism has itself been thought, any project
claiming to lead the way to a final overcoming of nihilism will remain sus-
pect, unable to ask whether or not it is in fact governed by the very same
logic it seeks to surpass. Nihilism, Heidegger cautions, is the most
unhomely of guests (dieses unheimlichster aller Gäste), an interloper who
may be found to have been lurking in the house of ontological thinking for
longer than anyone would have reason to suspect. “They seek salvation in
flight, namely in flight form a glimpse of the worthiness of questioning the
metaphysical position of man” (Heidegger 1958, 47).
To see why this is the case, let us look again at Jünger’s attempt to diag-
nose the tendential fulfillment of nihilism through the figure of the worker.
In his analysis of the worker, he is concerned not with the individual per-
son and his or her alienation so much as with what lies behind these expe-
riences: a Gestalt that imprints its mark on the fluid world of things and
beings. The Gestalt, or the “being in repose” that is embodied by the
worker, is distinct from that being which is subject to change. Unlike the-
ology, Gestalt does not name a first cause that brings beings into the world,
but is instead the “stamp” that imprints meaning on an otherwise mean-
ingless world of beings. In this sense, it is far closer to the concept of “cul-
ture” we have been discussing than to “God.” But as Heidegger points out,
this ontological distinction is not found only in nihilism: the name for the
difference between being understood as “stamp” and being understood as
“impressions” is transcendence, and it belongs fundamentally to the meta-
physical tradition. Beginning with Plato’s world of Forms, transcendence
construes meaning as something that is bestowed or transferred between a
(transcendental) subject and a (finite) object, between an agent who stamps
and a passive recipient that is marked.
Of course, Jünger’s account of nihilism also differs from classical theo-
ries of transcendence in at least one important way. Unlike Plato, Jünger
does not view the difference between the transcendent and the finite in
terms of two worlds held apart in near-absolute separation. On the contrary,
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the transcendental subject of Jünger’s existential analysis is humanity
itself—not this human or that group, but rather the species or type itself.
Insofar as humanity understands itself essentially as subject or will, it auto-
matically becomes the basis of all meaning and value. The subject is the will
to will, and it would prefer to will nothing rather than not will at all. In light
of this key distinction between classical transcendence and Jünger’s use of
the concept, Heidegger’s response is equally valid for any other project that
grounds itself in a concept of “humanity” or “tradition.”
According to its own terms, the success or failure of Heidegger’s
response to Jünger hinges on his ability to tease out a hidden link between
the metaphysical tradition and its grounding in transcendence on the one
hand, and nihilism understood as the absolute sovereignty of the will on
the other. The starting point for this endeavor is the status of “the nothing”
and its relation to “being,” a problem which haunts metaphysics from its
inception (“Why are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing?”). But
here Heidegger encounters a problem: the only vocabulary available to us
for this task has already been co-opted by the metaphysical tradition and its
particular determination of being as transcendence. For metaphysics, the
question of “the nothing” cannot be posed in any seriousness, since this
system is premised on the determination of “being” as subject, as whole-
ness or presence to self. On such a ground, “the nothing” can only be heard
in a vocabulary that is foreign to it: as a “lack” or “deficiency” of being.
Indeed, there can be no information or definition of the terms “being,”
“nothingness,” or “nihilism” that is not already determined by the meta-
physical determination of being as presence, or presence to itself.
In order to free ourselves from this constraint, Heidegger suggests, a
different way of speaking (ein anderes Sagen) is needed. He illustrates the
radical nature of what he has in mind when he proceeds to substitute for
the word “being” (bracketed in scare quotes: des “Seins”) a symbol com-
prised of the word “being” struck through with a diagonal cross (“des
Seins”). The crossing-out of being indicates the suspension of the transcen-
dental relation between “being in repose” and the world of impressions.
Being, as such, is not always already there such that it could turn toward the
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world and impress it in this or that way. On the contrary, there is no being
except in and as the turning or the crossing that constitutes history. Being
itself is therefore both called forth and dissolved in the turning.
Nothingness would have to be written, and that means thought of, just like
being. Inherent in this is that the essence of man which remembers belongs
to nothingness and not only as something added. If, therefore, in nihilism
nothingness attains dominance in a special manner, then man is not only
affected by nihilism but has an essential share in it. But then the entire
human “component realities” also do not stand somewhere on this side of
the line in order to cross over it and to settle down on the other side next to
being. The essence of man itself belongs to the essence of nihilism and
thereby to the phase of its completion. Man, as the essence put into use
[gebrauchte] in being helps to constitute the zone of being and that means at
the same time of nothingness. Man does not only stand in the critical zone
of the line. He himself, but not he for himself and particularly not through
himself alone, is this zone and thus the line. (83)
In asserting an “essential” connection between the human and nihilism,
this passage relies on the notion of the reciprocal “usage” (Brauch) of the
human and being, a thought which Heidegger develops at greater length in
the essays on language. While one often says that one uses language, and
one can also state that one puts beings to use, according to Heidegger being
itself (or rather, being) similarly “uses” the human—in and through lan-
guage—in order to take place. The crossing-out of the signifier “being,”
which denotes the suspension of any permanent, essential link to a
signified, initiates an attempt to think being as “finite transcendence,” or as
being that “is” only in the open trajectory of a historical project.
By way of closing, let us consider Heidegger’s passage in the context of
what Eco refers to as “Western culture.” On one hand, “being” is a name for
finitude, for a mark or scar that, at the moment of speaking, reveals this
common tradition as not-all. For as soon as one says “we” (and Latin
American cultural production’s myriad attempts to situate itself within the
Western tradition are all functions of a desire for communion), one is
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always already different from oneself. At the same time, being also names
the opening to an outside (a different kind of cut) that is the condition of
possibility for saying or hearing anything new at all. The projected over-
coming of nihilism, whether it understands itself as a recuperation or a
renewal of the highest values, is always a refusal of this finitude/opening.
The Boom novel could be situated on either side of this line. That is, it
can be seen either as an imagined crossing of the line, or as an approach
toward its “essence.” Depending on how one understands it, literature is
either an attempt to evade an encounter with the nothing (for instance,
insofar as we understand literature to be the memory of the Western tradi-
tion, or to embody “the best that has been thought and said”), or it is pre-
cisely a staging of this missed encounter (insofar as literature calls attention
to the fundamental instability of language itself ). Better put, literary lan-
guage is paradoxically both of these at the same time. Likewise, the phe-
nomenon of Eco: Revista de la cultura de occidente, which is in large part a
project of translating and publishing literature, would seem to embody
both of these tendencies to a certain degree. What, after all, are we speak-
ing of when we say “echo”? What “is” an echo? Can we even pose this
question? Does it have a being? To say “echo” is no doubt to presuppose
the existence of an “original,” and therefore, perhaps, to align oneself with
transcendence. But what remains to be decided is whether this origin is
“being,” or in fact the traversal of a void.
I
N O T E S
1. The first Colombian writer to appear in the journal is Alvaro Mutis, whose short story
“Sharaya” was published in volume 5 (September 1960). It would be another eight vol-
umes (May 1961) before Fernando Charry Lara’s poem “El desterrado” and José
Pubén’s short story “La merecedora” marked the reappearance of Latin American
writers in Eco.
2. The only published discussion of Eco I have been able to identify is Eduardo Jaramillo’s
fine essay “Eco: Revista de la cultura de occidente, 1960–1984” (1989).
3. Of course, it should also be noted that the very concept of “culture,” at least in the spe-
cific modern sense of mimesis, of the formation of the intellectual faculties according
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to an eidos, has always acted as a symptom of crisis. That is, what was so apparent to
nineteenth-century intellectuals—the need for “culture” as a forum in which to rep-
resent human “wholeness”—arose, in Europe at least, in direct proportion to the per-
ceived ill effects of industrial modernization (i.e., the fragmentation of social relations
and the distorted development of the organic person due to modern demands for spe-
cialization), while in Latin America the desire for “culture” and “civilization” was in
large part a function of Latin American intellectuals having equated the signifiers
“modernity” and “Europe.”
4. The essay was later republished under a different title, Zur Seinsfrage. English transla-
tions are available in The Question of Being (Heidegger 1958) and Pathmarks (Heidegger
1998). In the foreword to the slightly revised Zur Seinsfrage essay, Heidegger attributes
the change in title to his concern for underscoring the connection between an inter-
rogation of nihilism and what he describes as “a discussion of being as being” (einer
Erörterung des Seins als Sein herstammt). (1958, 33). The change of title thus points out
what is for Heidegger the telling difference between his attempt to think nihilism, and
Jünger’s attempt to think his way out of nihilism.
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